This file contains additional information such as Exif metadata which may have been added by the digital camera, scanner, or software program used to create or digitize it. If the file has been modified from its original state, some details such as the timestamp may not fully reflect those of the original file. The timestamp is only as accurate as the clock in the camera, and it may be completely wrong. From Wikimedia Commons, the free media repository. File information.
Structured data. Captions English Add a one-line explanation of what this file represents. They also were responsible for providing advice and assistance to the field offices in connection with ongoing investigations and with responding to threats of terrorist acts.
They also had to obtain resources to support investigations, such as arranging for translators or preparing documentation for re-allocation of money.
They needed to respond to requests to check telephone numbers, names, and other identifying information about targets of investigations in FBI and CIA databases.
While the IOSs acknowledged that collection and dissemination of intelligence information was one of their responsibilities, they stated that as a job function it was not a priority before September Several IOSs stated that it was impossible for IOSs to be aware of and disseminate every piece of information generated by every lead because of the demands of the other responsibilities of their jobs. As a result, they said that they had to focus on the most significant information that was generated from important cases or credible threats.
Jane, other IOSs, and special agents told us that the type of intelligence information that received immediate attention was that generated from explicit threats of an attack or other terrorist act, information that a terrorist who was in custody was being brought to the United States, or intelligence intercepts by another agency that led to a name and phone number in the United States of a target.
Other information was handled if there was time. By contrast, according to the CIA personnel, the dissemination of intelligence information requires full-time personnel trained solely for that purpose. Several witnesses stated that the review and approval process normally took several weeks to complete. While Williams had advanced only a theory, and there needed to be more analysis of the recommendations before they were adopted, the EC should have been presented to others in the FBI and the Intelligence Community for their information and analyses.
The fact that it was not disseminated reflected the longstanding problem within the FBI of information sharing being ad hoc and piecemeal. Rather than relying on the judgment of IOSs about what information should be disseminated as they juggle their other job duties, the FBI should have a system in place to guide, identify, and prioritize the kinds of information that need to be shared.
General complaints about the difficulties of working in ITOS We also heard consistently from witnesses in ITOS that working there before September 11 was extremely chaotic and difficult.
They complained that all aspects of their jobs — from putting FISA packages together to disseminating intelligence to sending out ECs to the field — were hampered by the lack of resources and poor technology. IOSs, agents, and managers uniformly told the OIG that IOSs did not have sufficient time to handle the workload in ITOS, and that because of the lack of resources in ITOS and the demands of operational matters in the section, they worked extremely long hours on a regular basis, including nights and weekends.
They described being overwhelmed with work, including intelligence information that needed to be disseminated. For example, they said that hundreds of leads could be generated by any one case.
They stated that the demands of a particular case or a particular threat sometimes consumed all of their time and attention for several days or even weeks.
We found that as a result, issues that they considered to be non-priority matters, such as the Phoenix EC, often were placed on the backburner. As we have discussed in several other OIG reports, ACS is a very cumbersome and non-user-friendly system that discourages its use. Instead, the user had to know that information existed in order to find it. As discussed above, this resulted in the Phoenix EC not being reviewed by the appropriate individuals, even when their names were on the attention line.
Individual performance We now turn to the actions of the individuals who were involved with the Phoenix EC. While the systemic problems hampered FBI employees in handling information such as the Phoenix EC, and explained to some extent the reasons that FBI employees did not adequately respond to it, these systemic problems do not explain all the deficiencies we found in the handling of the Phoenix EC. While we do not believe that anyone involved with the Phoenix EC at FBI Headquarters committed misconduct, we believe that some of them made errors in judgment with respect to some of their actions on the Phoenix EC.
Kenneth Williams First, we believe that Williams should be commended for his initiative and for his attempts to apply broad analytical thinking to his casework.
He prepared the Phoenix EC based on his experience, intuition, and expertise, and he sought assistance through the proper channels at FBI Headquarters in pursuing his theory. Williams deserves praise for, in the midst of handling cases in the field, discerning a pattern that he thought warranted review and seeking to bring that to the attention of others in the FBI.
By all accounts, Jane was hard working and conscientious. But the press of other work prevented her from addressing the Phoenix EC sufficiently. Instead, she kept the Phoenix EC to herself, hoping to get to it when time allowed. But she did not have time for it. We believe that, even if she intended to conduct research on it when time permitted, she should have provided it to members of the Intelligence Community for their input on the theories and recommendations it advanced.
She also noted in the disposition field of ACS how the lead was being handled. Ellen closed the lead, but rather than closing the lead, she should have reassigned the lead to Jane. While this was not inconsistent with how leads were handled in ITOS, given the pressure to close leads in the system, it misrepresented the status of the lead since the necessary research had not yet been completed. Jane briefly mentioned the Phoenix EC to Rob, but said he did not review it, and we do not believe he sought to ensure that it received adequate attention.
If he had decided that resources did not exist to address the EC for several months, we believe that he should have brought the matter to the attention of his section chief. As discussed above, Lynn had several years earlier worked on an investigation in which Subject No. Lynn explained that because the information in the EC about Subject No. Lynn was not required to respond to the e-mail by any formal FBI policy.
Her actions were consistent with others in the FBI, who did not address an issue unless a lead was assigned to them. Instead, Lynn did nothing in response to the e-mail. A response from Lynn may have caused Jane to take some other step, to seek further input from someone else, or to alert Phoenix of the status. He told the OIG that he was not aware of any information that supported the theory in the EC, and he therefore did not respond to it, either in writing or by contacting anyone in the Phoenix office.
Jay was not required to respond to the Phoenix EC, and he did not violate any FBI policies and procedures by not responding. Since Jay told us he felt strongly that the theory in the Phoenix EC was not supported by the facts, we believe he should have contacted Williams or someone in FBI Headquarters to discuss the EC to provide his view, given the expertise of the New York office on issues involving Bin Laden.
But given the disorganization and convoluted way that leads were assigned, and the prevailing practice not to respond to leads that were not specifically assigned to an agent, it is not surprising that Jay did not respond. FBI management Finally, we believe it important to state that the failings in this case go well beyond any failings of those individuals who came in contact with the Phoenix EC. This was the responsibility of many FBI managers and employees, from the top down, over many years.
While some of the individuals who handled the Phoenix EC did not do all they should have to address it in a timely way, the larger and more important failure was the way the FBI handled intelligence analysis for many years before the September 11 attacks.
We reviewed the information provided by the FBI that referenced a connection between airplanes or flight schools and persons of interest to the FBI. The information was from as early as , although most of it was from and Below we briefly describe four of the pieces of information that are representative of the kinds of information contained in FBI files about airplanes and flight schools at the time the Phoenix EC was received at FBI Headquarters: The FBI received an intelligence report in mid stating that the leadership of a terrorist organization other than Al Qaeda had met and planned to use students in the United States to gather intelligence on infrastructure facilities and public places frequented by Jews.
The New York Division sent out leads in an attempt to obtain more information about the source of the reporting. In January , Philippine authorities responded to a small fire and several explosions in an apartment in Manila. Inside the apartment, authorities discovered bomb-making equipment and terrorist literature.
The resulting investigation revealed a plot to place explosive devices in 12 American passenger aircraft. Yousef later was convicted on November 13, , for his involvement in the bombing of the World Trade Center on February 23, During investigative interviews, Murad described general conversations with Yousef in which they discussed the potential use of aircraft to commit terrorist acts. According to Murad, he discussed with Yousef the ease with which a pilot could conduct a suicide attack by crashing an explosive-laden aircraft into a building.
Murad mentioned CIA Headquarters as a potential target. Murad contended in investigative interviews that there was no specific planning in relation to any of these acts. Murad also described other general conversations with Yousef concerning potential non-aircraft related terrorist acts, such as bombing a nuclear facility, utilizing poison gas, and bombing the World Trade Center a second time.
As discussed above, the FBI conducted little strategic analysis before September 11, and it never attempted to connect any of these disparate pieces of information. They should have sought input from others in the FBI, assured that the EC received the necessary analysis, and also sought input from the Intelligence Community about the theories and suggestions contained in it.
But we believe that their actions were not surprising, given that the policies and practices under which they operated were extremely flawed. We found that IOSs were not properly managed and that supervisors should have been more actively involved in the work assigned to IOSs. In addition, as an institution, the FBI was focused on its operational priorities at the expense of conducting strategic analysis. Furthermore, the FBI lacked a systematic approach to information sharing and lacked adequate tools to facilitate such information sharing both within and outside the FBI.
We also cannot know what role, if any, the pieces of other information described above would have played in the analysis of this question.
What we do know is that the FBI was not adequately analyzing information for the purpose of drawing conclusions and making predictions. This was a significant intelligence failure, which hindered the chances of the FBI being able to detect and prevent the September 11 attacks.
Footnotes A redacted copy of this document is attached in the Appendix. For example, the Phoenix memo should have been disseminated to all field offices and to our sister agencies.
ISD was eliminated in the beginning of Williams was responsible for the Subject No. Williams stated in the EC that Subject No. ERAU offers a degree in aerospace engineering with a concentration in aeronautical engineering. Aeronautical engineering is the study of aircraft design. A certificate in airframe and power plant operations allows an individual to become an aviation maintenance mechanic.
The courses for this certificate deal largely with maintaining aircraft in airworthy condition. After September 11, Subject No. We asked Williams to confirm the courses these individuals took.
After reviewing their files, Williams told the OIG that only two of the individuals were enrolled in pilot training and the other four were enrolled in aeronautical engineering. An EC requires a case number field to be completed. Williams used the Subject No.
Chechnya is a republic of the former Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in , Chechen separatists — both Islamic and non-Islamic — have sought independence from Russia.
Williams wrote in the EC that Subject No. At the request of the FBI, we have omitted the true names of most of the agents and the analysts who are discussed in this report. In the summer of , the OIG received new allegations from a former FBI confidential informant whose control agent had been Williams. The former informant alleged that he had informed Williams in October that he was concerned that a terrorist could use crop duster airplanes as weapons and that one of the subjects of the Phoenix EC and other Middle Easterners were attending flight schools in Arizona.
The former informant also said that he believed Williams had written the Phoenix EC because in May the informant had raised complaints with the Phoenix FBI about how it handled him as an informant and why he was closed as an informant in At the time, the electronic routing table in ACS for the Counterterrorism Division was set up to automatically route leads associated with cases with the type of case number designated on the Phoenix EC to an administrative unit in ITOS rather than to a particular operational unit.
The Special Agent confirmed that Jane gave him the EC along with the note, but he was not able to locate the post-it note when he retrieved the original EC several months later. She handled all counterterrorism-related analytical work for the FBI field office in which she was employed. Jane later informed the OIG that she handed the Phoenix EC to Rob, that he skimmed the synopsis, and that he listened to her summary of the document and proposed course of action.
We were told that in the squad that handled Bin Laden matters received approximately 3, leads. At the time, the SSA was out of the office on extended medical leave. They both said the EC did not relate to what they were researching, and they did not do anything with it. As of September 11, , the FBI had developed a draft of a report that was purportedly the threat assessment.
The OIG reviewed a draft of the report in May To specifically indicate the pedophile's gender preference, members of pedophilic organizations encourage the use of descriptions such as "boylove", "girllove", and "childlove. U The BoyLover logo BLogo is a small blue spiral-shaped triangle surrounded by a larger triangle, whereby the small triangle represents a small boy and the larger triangle represents an adult man. Research of the marking concluded that the BoyLover logo BLogo was imprinted on the front of the coin, and the phrase "Kids Love Pedos" was engraved on the back of the coin.
The appearance of the BLogo on coins is another method used by pedophiles to announce their sexual preferences. U Pedophilia symbols on jewelry, coins, Web sites and other effects are indicative of advertisement methods used by child sexual predators to promote their cause. Pedophile activists advocate for the social acceptance of sexual relationships between adults and children.
These organizations seek to decriminalize sexual relationships between adults and children and to legalize child pornography based on their belief that children have the ability to consent to sexual acts.
Investigators should also be attentive to pedophilia symbols advertised on Web sites. During examinations of computer files, investigators should be conscious of subjects who try to conceal child pornography by labeling them with symbols instead of the typical suggestive explicit names.
Please address all comments or questions to the Innocent Images Unit at Your response will help us serve you more effectively and efficiently in the future. Thank you for cooperation and assistance. The product was timely and relevant to your mission, programs, priorities or initiatives. The product was clear and logical in the presentation of information with supported judgments and conclusions. The product is reliable i.
The product identified new information associated with pending matters or offered insights into information that could change the working premise in a program or initiative. U Ibid. How to contact WikiLeaks? What is Tor? Tips for Sources After Submitting. Contact us if you have specific problems If you have a very large submission, or a submission with a complex format, or are a high-risk source, please contact us.
What computer to use If the computer you are uploading from could subsequently be audited in an investigation, consider using a computer that is not easily tied to you.
Do not talk about your submission to others If you have any issues talk to WikiLeaks. Act normal If you are a high-risk source, avoid saying anything or doing anything after submitting which might promote suspicion. Remove traces of your submission If you are a high-risk source and the computer you prepared your submission on, or uploaded it from, could subsequently be audited in an investigation, we recommend that you format and dispose of the computer hard drive and any other storage media you used.
If you face legal action If a legal action is brought against you as a result of your submission, there are organisations that may help you. Submit documents to WikiLeaks.
0コメント